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Elena Chebankova’s Political Ideologies in Contemporary Russia is at once a most valuable 
addition to the literature on political thought in Russia and a book that will frustrate 
some readers. The book’s value lies in its comprehensive review of  the many dif-
ferent strands of  contemporary ideology in Russia. There has, quite simply, not 
been a book like this on Russian political thinking for years, and the last surveys of  
Russian political thought that were anywhere near as comprehensive as 
Chebankova’s were surveys of  nineteenth century thought. Even then they generally 
specialized in one area of  thought—conservatism, Slavophilism, Marxism, pop-
ulism, etc. Chebankova’s review covers liberalism, conservatism, what she calls “fun-
damental conservatism,” the left, nationalism, foreign policy ideas on multipolarism, 
multiculturalism, and feminism. She has done a Stakhanovite amount of  reading 
and performs heroic feats of  synthesis and precis whilst all the time developing 
critical thoughts on the literature she reviews. Moreover, this is not a work of  sterile 
intellectual history. Chebankova is interested in ideas as programmes for political 
action in addition to her interest in them as ideas, and this serves as a very useful 
reminder that there are multiple political traditions that might influence Russia’s fu-
ture development. Nearly all of  the chapters end with a short and useful summary 
of  who are the main actors and groups pushing liberalism, conservatism, etc. 
One of  the most impressive feats that Chebankova manages is to avoid 
simple dichotomies within many of  the currents of  thought that she reviews. The 
most notable and usual of  these dichotomies is the regime loyalist/regime opponent 
divide. This divide, she notes, is too simplistic in its pitting of  liberals, the left, fem-
inists, and some others against the regime, which is sometimes seen as solely com-
prising conservatives. In fact nearly all streams of  political thought are pluralist and 
contain divergent approaches to the Putin regime, and sometimes these streams 
cross. A case in point is the “fundamental conservatives,” the less liberal branch of  
conservatism in Chebankova’s account, who are more concerned with the rejection 
of  Western modernity. Many of  the leading lights of  “fundamental conservatism,” 
such as Aleksandr Dugin, who have often been cited as regime ideologists and loy-
alists, differ quite fundamentally from the regime, Chebankova argues, in their desire 
for meaningful political contestation between ideas. The dichotomization of  Russian 
thought into good liberal versus bad conservative also hides some of  the stranger 
elements of  Russian liberalism that do not fit with the idea that liberalism is the 
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natural antipode to Putin and “unproblematic.” Elements of  Russian liberalism are 
critical of  ideas of  “Russianness” and national character contemporaneously to, as 
Chebankova points out, the point of  nihilism and national self-loathing. Some have 
even gone so far as to praise Russian collaborators with the Nazis and have argued 
that the Nazi invasion of  Russia was to some extent a liberation from Russia’s or-
ganic, and therefore bad, traditions. There are similar interesting and novel facts, 
and thought-provoking discussions of  the other ideological positions, in the book. 
Why will Chebankova’s book also frustrate many readers, given its many 
impressive aspects? First, there is sometimes little sense of  the relative importance 
of  the thinkers and ideas that Chebankova describes. This is a side-effect of   
Chebankova trying to give an overall sense of  each ideology, and relate Russian to 
Western thinking. However, this can lead to a kind of  flattening out of  thinkers and 
ideas as they become rolled into the “whole” ideology. The summary sections on 
the main actors and groups pushing each position only partially restores some sense 
of  the relative importance of  ideas. Extreme positions, such as the Nazi invasion 
of  Russia as a liberation idea, that are illustrative of  some sections of  an ideology 
get equal billing with elements of  ideology that are arguably more important polit-
ically.   
The second problem with the book is its treatment of  Putinism. 
Chebankova is well aware that many readers will pick up her book looking for a dis-
cussion of  Putinism as an ideology. Very quickly in the introduction and in the first 
endnote to the book she lets them know that they are not going to get one since 
“Putinism itself  does not represent a particular ideology for it lacks a substantive 
as well as a positionist component” (267). Putinism is, Chebankova argues, a “system 
for balancing paradigmatically different ideological positions” (16). That statement 
raises more questions than it answers. Putinism, if  there is an ideology of  Putinism, 
would not be the first syncretic ideology, and other such ideologies have been anal-
ysed. The definition of  Putinism as a “system for balancing” demands some dis-
cussion of  which positions are balanced and how this balancing takes place. What 
—ideas, issues, preferences, signifiers—facilitates balancing, how do they alter the 
positions balanced, and to what end politically? 
Chebankova’s dismissal of  the ideological nature of  Putinism is not, there-
fore, very satisfactory or convincing. This is a pity. Discussion of  what Putinism is 
has become an increasingly important issue over the last few years and Chebankova 
could have made a telling contribution to that debate. The importance of  the issue 
forces her to come back to it in her brief  concluding chapter, despite having said 
that she would not. Unfortunately she undoes some of  the good work that she did 
earlier in this conclusion. With little space left to her she aggregates the schools of  
thought into “liberalism” and “traditionalism.” In essence these are little more than 
the traditional binary categories of  Westernism and Slavophilism, the sort of  bina-
ries that Chebankova spent so much time usefully avoiding in the bulk of  the book. 
Putinism becomes the effort to manage the drives of  these two categories, from 
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global capitalism on the one hand and traditional social and religious identities on 
the other. Chebankova thinks that Putin will continue to try to balance “liberalism” 
and “traditionalism.” Maybe she is right. But the balancing act creates political prob-
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